tal degradation. One billion people, including about 340m of the world's extreme poor, are estimated to live in fragile states. These countries lag behind in meeting all the Millennium Development Goals. They account for about a third of the deaths in poor countries from HIV/AIDS, a third of those who lack access to clean water, and a third of children who do not complete primary school. Half of all the world's children who do not live to the age of five are born in fragile states. And fragile states have poverty rates averaging 54%, compared to 22% in other low-income countries.
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Fragile states' neighbours are also at risk, often suffering the hardships caused by refugee flows, warring groups, contagious diseases and transnational criminal networks that traffic in drugs, arms and people. As we have seen most recently in South Asia and Africa, fragile states can create fragile regions. It is much harder for economies to prosper if they cannot sell to, buy from, invest with or even transit through their neighbours.
Landlocked countries with failed or failing neighbours can lose access to the world economy. And as the world witnessed seven years ago on 11 September, broken states can be the weak link in the global security chain if they are infiltrated by terrorists who recruit, train and prosper amidst devastation.
The trauma of fragile states and the interconnections of globalisation require our generation to recognise anew the nexus among economics, governance and security. Most wars are now conflicts within states, and fragile states account for most of them. But our knowledge about how best to respond remains thin.
We maintain this ignorance at our peril. The disease, outflows of desperate people, criminality and terrorism that can spawn in the vacuum of fragile states can quickly become global threats. Moreover, they represent a terrible loss to the world: leaving one billion people in destitution represents a tragic waste of human energy, creativity, invention and possibility.
Fragile states are the toughest development challenge of our era. Those who have struggled with this problem on the ground are no doubt correct when they caution that 'no one size fits all'. As one expert warns, the worst thing the development community could do is develop a step-by-step handbook for dealing with fragile states.
Yet that warning is true for any security, diplomatic, political or economic problem. Without being formulaic, we can and need to do better, learning from experience. As Mark Twain prudently cautioned, history may not repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes.
Too often, the development community has treated states affected by fragility and conflict simply as harder cases of development. No doubt new aspects of globalisation, such as climate change, rapid urbanisation and greater levels of inequality within countries can become entwined with fragility and violence. Yet these situations require looking beyond the analytics of development to a different framework of building security, legitimacy, governance and economy. This is not security, or development, as usual. Nor is it about what we have come to think of as peacebuilding or peacekeeping. This is about securing development -bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence. The stakes are very high. That's why I identified states emerging from conflict or seeking to avoid breakdown as one of the World Bank Group's six strategic challenges shortly after becoming president last year.
Understanding fragile states
Academic analysis of how to measure, categorise or rank fragility vary, but three main characteristics stand out: ineffective government, poverty and conflict.
The United Kingdom's Department for International Development defines fragile states as 'those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor'.
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Ashraf Ghani and his colleague Clare Lockhart refer to a 'sovereignty gap' -a disjunction between the state's capacity to govern by law and its capacity to provide for the needs of the people in practice. What is missing in fragile states, they argue, is 'a process for connecting citizens' voices to government and making government accountable to citizens for its decisions'.
Fragility does not just mean low growth, but a failure in the normal growth process, such that poverty becomes a persistent condition. Weak governance, corruption and insecurity combine in a downward spiral.
Fragile states also run a higher risk of conflict than other developing countries. Fragility and poverty alone do not necessarily lead to conflict, but low and stagnant incomes, unemployment and ineffective government can create an environment that sparks violence. They may increase the opportunity for predators to tempt young, disconnected men This unwinding reverses development gains. It makes the post-conflict state even more vulnerable to collapse than it was pre-conflict. 'Civil war', Collier asserts, 'is development in reverse'. 5 Collier estimates that post-conflict countries are twice as likely as other developing countries to fall into conflict, and that about half of countries recovering from conflict relapse within the first decade.
A recent study by RAND examines the problems of fragile states in terms of the overlaps among government, the economy and security. Breakdowns in any of these areas, say the authors, reinforce breakdown in the others.
The result is not just a conflict trap, but a web of unfit government, economic collapse and insecurity that breeds violence.
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Looking across the analytical frameworks for understanding fragile states, we can see a number of common threads, and also some gaps. To help countries caught in fragile situations, we need to understand the state of their societies and the external forces bearing upon them. In some parts of the world, notably Africa, the challenge is nation building as well as state building.
Secondly, the linkages and overlaps among weak governance, poverty and conflict help to explain how states can remain fragile over decades.
They also suggest that if we want to help these countries -first and foremost by preventing a resumption of conflict -we need to have a much better understanding of the interconnections among these conditions. An initial step should be to look more closely at possible predictors or indicators of civil violence, such as historical divisions, ethnic and tribal grievances, environmental factors such as drought, or economic conflicts.
If conflict is often the reoccurrence of past violence, then we need to give greater attention to stopping the cycle of conflict.
Today, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts have received the bulk of development assistance. This is understandable. It is hard to get donors to pay attention to something that has not yet happened.
But conflict prevention must be a better way to ensure stability and peace than picking up the pieces after conflict has destroyed societies, institutions and lives. Prevention should not just be about last-ditch efforts to avert violence, but about making peace settlements stick through sustained security and support. When risks of conflict increase, those that may be able to avert it need to act quickly. If mediation is possible, we may need more flexibility to offer prompt economic support.
Thirdly, the most critical challenges are concentrated where governance, economy and security intersect. We need to integrate a variety of tools -military, political, legal, developmental, financial and technical -and a variety of actors, including states, international organisations, civil society and the private sector. This will not be easy.
I was struck how an observation of former US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake parallels my own experience:
Mention the deleterious political effects of a sound economic policy at a meeting of economic planners and watch their fingers drum impatiently on a table. Talk about the economic details at a conference of diplomats working on a political settlement and watch their eyes glaze. Tell a politician about the importance of painful economic sacrifice now for the sake of economic health later and watch his or her eyes widen in alarm.
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Ten priorities
To assist in drawing the disciplines together, let me suggest ten considera- (
1) Focus on building the legitimacy of the state
In all things, one should keep in mind the need to build the legitimacy of the fragile state. In the terms of Clausewitz, building legitimacy is the Schwerpunkt, the centre of gravity, of the strategy.
Of course, achieving security is fundamental, but even that activity must be connected to realising the strategic purpose. Project sustainability is important, but in some cases -such as delivering seeds, fertilizers and tools to farmers for the first planting -sustainability concerns may need to take second place. This is difficult for some development donors to accept.
To achieve legitimacy, it is not only the services that matter, but who per- If we are serious about stopping the downward spiral of violence and state breakdown, larger forces need to be kept in place longer. To build confidence, UN peacekeeping mandates and renewals should be authorised for much longer than 6-12 months. In some cases, we may need mandates that are less restrictive, so UN operations can prevent the outbreak of violence.
Development experts, in turn, need to recognise the priority of using economic progress to boost security. When soldiers discuss the economics of security, their first priority is jobs, no matter how created. When a security gain can be leveraged, development projects may need to be suboptimal economically -'good enough' rather than 'first-best'. When areas of a country are still insecure, development may need to be pursued piecemeal through pilot projects.
To build legitimacy and effectiveness, international partners also need to assist the fragile state to build, and pay for, its own reliable police and armed forces. Properly organised and trained, local police and military are key to securing public support, gaining intelligence and sustaining security.
A good police force and army are worth the investment, because ill-trained forces or an officer corps that does not respect the government's legitimacy will perpetuate or even worsen a destructive situation. Job training and placement for ex-combatants, to help transform fighters into participants in recovery, is also a critical need -and a consistent deficiency.
(3) Build the rule of law
A fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development is an effective rule of law, including respect for property rights. A legal order is a safeguard against the serious risk of criminalisation of the state. Corruption adds to fragility and undermines legitimacy. Abuse of state power destroys confidence, and ultimately the state's core purpose. Building the rule of law is also vital to public safety -poorly trained and paid police usually add to fragility by arming and empowering predators. In much of Afghanistan, the greatest security fear for businesspeople is kidnapping, often by the police.
Yet the international security and development communities have let the task of building justice and law-enforcement systems fall between the cracks.
Successful efforts to build a police force in Bosnia seem to be the exception that proves the rule. It is not clear to me where the international capacity exists to help establish basic courts and tribunals to resolve disputes, train judges and advocates, and build prisons and police forces, all of which need to recognise local cultural and legal traditions. Efforts by the United Nations
Department for Peacekeeping Operations to launch an Office of the Rule of
Law and Security Institutions is a start, but much more needs to be done.
(4) Bolster local and national ownership
Local and national ownership in state building is fundamental to achieving legitimacy, trust and effectiveness.
Community-driven development programmes, which give control over If donors cannot work with a government to build national accountability systems that donors can trust, how can one expect the public to trust its own government? Recall that the strategic centre of gravity is to build legitimacy through good and effective governance.
(5) Ensure economic stability
Macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for effective recovery. Countries need to get the fundamentals right -fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies -so that there can be stable economic conditions that permit markets to expand and trade to resume, and which allow people to rely on a currency as a store of value and investors to feel more secure about saving and building.
But we also have to recognise that fragile states are just that, fragile, especially in the face of sudden shocks. They need specialised, real-time monitoring that can assess and respond to changing external conditions -such as fast-rising food and energy prices -with speed and flexible support. Reforms for economic stability need to be sequenced with political cycles to avoid triggering governance crises that will make economic reform impossible.
The international financial institutions -including the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group -need tools to provide help quickly, such as by clearing arrears, and to fill gaps promptly, whether for governmental capacity, food or balance-of-payments support. The challenge for donors increases when the technocrats who may be in charge at the start of reconstruction give way to political leaders.
Unfortunately, development technocrats are too often dismissive of the arts and compromises of politics. At the same time, a new political leadership that has come of age through fighting or in exile will need support, and some patience, in learning their new roles and responsibilities.
(7) Crowd in, not out, the private sector
It is important that a focus on building state legitimacy, capacity and performance not lead us to overlook the very engine of sustainable recovery and growth: a healthy private sector.
Private-sector development and the creation of small businesses spurs investment, jobs, opportunity and hope. It empowers the market to meet local needs, whether for food, basic goods or services. A healthy private sector will eventually provide the source of sustainable revenues for a legitimate government.
To some extent, private-sector development can happen even in the absence of formal legal frameworks and financial sectors, drawing on
Conflict and instability can be a lucrative business
private remittances and transfers from abroad. Protection of property rights through traditional institutions and networks can help, as we are seeing in Northern Somalia. But early efforts to signal the value the government places on investing in the future -whether through work or capital -are important. Enforceable property and contract rights, and basic security that prevents predation on businesses, offer the foundation. Transparent and simple rules lower the costs of doing business and enable people to get started without fearing confiscations by the state.
Given the risks and uncertainties of investing in a post-conflict environment, fragile states will need a combination of public and private support.
Institutions such as the World Bank Group, through its private-sector arm, the International Financial Corporation, can provide investment and advisory services, help assess the investment climate, develop basic financial services and microcredit, encourage better governance and rule of law, and enable an environment for private-sector activity.
We need to develop more innovative models for leveraging public and private capital to build basic infrastructure, such as power plants, ports, and communications, transport and energy systems. Post-conflict environments are also an opportunity for small and medium enterprises to develop.
In addition, we need to acknowledge that risk is simply a factor in dealing with fragile states. We need to be prepared for some projects to fail in these countries if the larger effort is to have a chance.
(8) Coordinate across institutions and actors
States, international institutions, foundations, NGOs and the private sector all have a role to play in helping countries in fragile situations. But without greater coordination -and even integration -of activities, we will overwhelm the very governments we seek to help.
The average developing country hosts 260 visits from donors a year. Liberia, including through the provision of regional peacekeeping forces.
In its early days, the Bonn process for Afghanistan appeared to encourage the recognition of common interests among regional countries in lowering trade barriers, investing in energy and transit, controlling illegal narcotics, and pledging political non-interference, but that accomplishment has seriously frayed. As the new Iraqi government has strengthened its legitimacy, it has made efforts to reach accommodations with its neighbours. Militaries have made advances in counter-insurgency strategies, operations and training. Yet the military arm is but one tool, which must be integrated with political and economic capabilities to be successful.
Ultimately, the most important element in fragile or post-conflict states is the people of those countries. Those who made war need to make peace.
Soldiers and aid workers need to cooperate to help the people in these countries shift from being victims to becomng the principal agents of recovery.
Without this cooperation, efforts to save fragile states are likely to fail, and we will all pay the consequences.
Our appreciation of how best to secure development -to synthesise security, governance and economics to be most effective -is still modest.
I have been encouraging development and finance ministers, experts and practicing professionals to think about fragile states with new perspectives and to reach out to other disciplines to better understand their experience and insights.
To expand our understanding and work on fragile states, the World Bank Group is organising 'headline seminars', convening people from different disciplines, publishing research and best-practice notes, assembling an Advisory Group, and reconsidering our operational procedures, training, resources and support. I hope that think tanks such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies can help us strengthen the exchange among security specialists, students of governance, development practitioners and political leaders.
One of the strategic challenges for the World Bank Group is modernising multilateralism. We need to help overhaul the institutions and regimes of multilateralism, some established over 60 years ago, to meet the necessities of a very different era. The time is ripe, and the dangers -and opportunities -of fragile states will be on the agenda for all of us. 
